If your admins launch MCP servers with uvx or npx, the version pinned in the config freezes only the top-level package. Every library underneath it can change on the next rebuild, and that code runs with whatever credentials the server holds. Corelight measured this on one administrator's workstation: an MCP server pinned to a single release and commit ran with 15 different sets of dependencies over five weeks, and 23 of its 69 packages changed versions underneath it. The fix it tested, a hash-locked install launched directly, held across 457 starts. That is the policy to roll out this quarter.
No compromise was found. This is a structural exposure in how many MCP servers are installed, and it sits on machines that talk to firewalls and SIEMs.
What Corelight Actually Measured
A single "pinned" MCP server ran with 15 distinct dependency sets in five weeks, and the packages that moved were the security-sensitive ones. James Lagermann, Corelight's director of technical alliances, published the analysis on November 10. The packages that changed included cryptography, the JSON Web Token library (four versions) and the MCP SDK itself.
The setup was ordinary. An administrator's workstation ran AI coding assistants that launched MCP servers with uvx. Each config entry named an exact release tag, PyPI version or Git commit, according to Help Net Security's write-up. The community server's own project had pinned its seven direct dependencies exactly and published a hash-pinned lock file. The launcher ignored that lock file and installed from the package's declared dependencies, so roughly 60 transitive packages were resolved fresh from PyPI within whatever ranges were allowed.
The rebuild cadence is what turns a theoretical gap into a real one:
- The assistant started the server 162 times in one week, and a Git-tag source was checked against GitHub on every start.
- The local cache held 19 builds of one release and commit over five weeks, which produced the 15 distinct environments.
- In one test, a normal launch rebuilt the environment with two dependencies released the previous day.
- A second server, pinned to a commit, had 19 builds and 17 distinct environments, and its MCP framework ran two major versions ahead of the project's own lock file.
Those servers were not idle. Over one week the workstation's MCP servers made more than 1,600 connections to 11 management systems, including the firewall, SIEM and sensor management.
Why a Version Pin Does Not Freeze the Code
A pin in uvx tool@1.2.3 fixes one package name and version; it says nothing about the 60 packages that package depends on. The tooling does what its documentation says it does. uv stores a uvx environment in its cache and treats it as disposable: "The environment is only cached to reduce the overhead of repeated invocations," and "if the environment is removed, a new one will be created automatically." The uv tools guide notes that the @ syntax "cannot be used for anything other than an exact version" of the tool you name. Nothing in that path reads the server's lock file.
npx follows the same pattern on the JavaScript side. Packages that are not present locally are installed to a folder in the npm cache, and the install prompt can be suppressed with --yes, which is how most config snippets ship. Add @latest and you have asked for new code on every launch.
Corelight found that pattern in vendor instructions too. Some hosted-MCP setup guides told users to run npx <proxy>@latest, and one proxy released six versions in a month, four of them within 14 hours. One vendor's setup disabled TLS certificate checking. A security vendor's official server declared its direct dependencies with no upper version limit.
The authors are explicit that this is not a flaw in MCP. Every case came from setup instructions or configuration, which means it is yours to fix.
How Common Is It?
Most MCP servers in Corelight's sample have this problem: 23 of the 35 servers it reviewed had a recommended install that resolved dependencies fresh from a public registry. The 35 came from two vendor catalogs and Corelight's lab, so it is a sample of what admins install from the usual catalogs. Lagermann's own read is blunter: "So far, 100% of administrators that I've talked to were using at least one MCP Server with this issue," he told Help Net Security.
Corelight notified the maintainers of the 23 public servers. One company hosting an AI agent exchange has since updated its submission security review, and another vendor is repackaging its MCP server, per the same report.
Why This Matters Now: The Worms Already Target MCP Packages
Registry-level attacks against MCP-themed packages have already happened, so "pulls whatever is newest" is a live risk. In June 2026 a Shai-Hulud variant reached PyPI. SecurityWeek reported on June 9 that a second Hades wave on June 8 hit at least 29 PyPI packages, in an attack that reached bioinformatics, graph machine learning and MCP-themed projects and carried the same credential-harvesting, self-spreading behavior as its npm counterpart.
MCP tooling has its own history. JFrog disclosed CVE-2025-6514, a CVSS 9.6 flaw in the mcp-remote proxy affecting versions 0.0.5 through 0.1.15, fixed in 0.1.16. We have covered the same pattern from other angles: the LiteLLM PyPI backdoor, the ChainDrop worm that persisted through agent configs, and the Plugin4Shell pin bypass, where a "pinned commit" turned out to be a branch.
A floating dependency tree on an admin workstation means a malicious release can be running against your SIEM credentials after the next environment rebuild, without anyone editing a config. Corelight's cache logged 19 such rebuilds of one server in five weeks.
What a Freeze That Holds Looks Like
A hash-locked install, launched directly with update checks off, kept five servers identical across 457 starts in two weeks. Corelight's tested sequence:
- Pin to a commit, not a tag.
- Generate a hash-pinned lock file for your platform, constrained to the maintainer's versions. In uv,
uv exportwrites a lockfile out as a pip-compatible requirements file. - Install into a dedicated environment with hash checking enforced. pip's hash-checking mode requires a hash for every requirement and can be forced with
--require-hashes; then install the server itself with--no-depsso nothing resolves outside the lock. - Point the AI client at the installed server's executable, not at
uvxornpx. - Turn off startup update checks. The MCP framework Corelight tested checked PyPI at startup and cached the answer for 12 hours.
Two side effects. Startup dropped from 4-11 seconds to about 2 seconds, and after the one-time install there were no GitHub or PyPI connections at all, which makes any new one a signal.
The strongest objection is that freezing trades drift for staleness, and Corelight concedes it. The frozen community server ended up with 40 packages older than what the launcher would have pulled that day, some of them security-sensitive. A frozen install with nobody re-locking it is worse than a floating one. Lagermann's own recommendation is to follow each maintainer's update guidance; his servers are reviewed nightly and updated the next morning with a change log. The policy needs a named owner and a re-lock schedule, or it decays.
Where the Allowlist Policy Has to Change
Your MCP allowlist should approve an install method as well as a server name, because the name alone does not fix the code. Our buyer's guide to MCP server governance argued for enforcing at the client; this is a concrete rule to enforce there. Any config entry whose command is uvx, npx, pipx run or a @latest tag is a source that can pull new code on the next session, whether the client is Claude, Cursor, Codex or Gemini CLI.
The MCP specification already asks clients to help. Its security best practices say a client offering one-click local server setup MUST show the exact command, untruncated, before executing it, and SHOULD run servers in a sandbox with minimal default privileges. Neither stops a pinned command from resolving new transitive code, which is why the install method belongs in policy. The same lesson showed up in the coding-agent allowlist that said Python and meant any command and in VS Code's three MCP command-execution flaws.
What to Do About It
Start with the servers that hold admin credentials, because that is where a bad dependency does the most damage.
This Week:
- Grep every managed AI client config on admin and developer workstations for
uvx,npx,pipx runand@latest. List each hit with the credentials that server holds. - Ask your network team for hosts making short, repeated connections to PyPI, npm and GitHub. Corelight's launcher sessions lasted 0.1 to 1.5 seconds against roughly 30 seconds for a browser, and the admin workstation stood out with 203 GitHub and 136 PyPI connections.
- Read the
mcp-remoteversion on any workstation that uses it and confirm it is 0.1.16 or later.
This Month:
- Freeze every credential-holding server with the five steps above, and verify by comparing installed package lists, not configs.
- Give each frozen server an owner and a re-lock date. Monthly is a reasonable default; follow the maintainer's cadence where it is faster.
- Scope each server's tokens to what its tools need, using read-only modes and expiring tokens where the target system supports them.
Before Your Next Vendor Review:
- Ask every vendor that ships an MCP server for a hash-pinned requirements file per release, bounded dependency ranges, and documentation of startup network activity.
- Reject any setup instruction that disables TLS verification or pins a proxy to
@latest.
The Bottom Line
Version pinning in an MCP config gives you the same false comfort a package.json with caret ranges gave web teams a decade ago: the name you reviewed stays fixed and everything beneath it moves. The difference is placement. These processes sit on admin workstations with live connections to the firewall and the SIEM. Corelight's numbers show the fix works and costs one re-lock routine per server.
Run the config grep this week and freeze the servers that hold admin credentials first.
Continue Reading
- MCP Server Governance: Enforce at the Client, Not the Registry
- Your Agent Allowlist Says Python. It Means Any Command.
- The Pinned Commit Was a Branch. Check Your Git Host.
- LiteLLM's October 21 Compromise Puts Provider Keys at Risk
- VS Code 1.145.3 Fixes Three MCP Flaws That Let Servers Run Commands
- npm Pulled the Packages. Your Agent Config Reinfects You.
